A Simple Question

Do conservatives not realize that they lost the election on the economy? Apparently the answer is "no," as we see this from WaPo today:

"A group of us Republican senators are working on coming up with an alternative package that I would hope would have some elements to it that Americans would support," said McCain, who lost the November 4 U.S. election to Obama, a Democrat.

The voters don't think you're ideas will work to fix the economy, stop pushing the ideology and let those who won the election go to work.

As for negotiating the bailout package...this is a debate over two very different economic theories; a stimulus package that is a patchwork of both serves no one well except Republicans who can hang on to their economic ideology for a little while longer.

The Grad Student Job Search

So it's been well over a month since I last posted, and even then I'm not sure if there were any readers still left in these parts, but I figured I'd give this a shot anyways. I'm in need of some sage guidance, or at least some new ideas or funny stories, so if you've got anything at all to say, please pipe in.

Here I sit with under a month before the new semester kicks off, and I'm still not sure where I'm going to be working through the school year. Last year I was able to continue working with the company I'm currently employed by - where I've been for well over 2 years now - and this worked out with only a few kinks. They allowed me great flexibility in my schedule with the single requirement that I work at least 32 hours per week. This was fairly manageable with my course load of 6 credits first semester and a 10-ish hour per week research assistantship. Second semester proved more difficult as a was continuing the assistantship and 32 hours weeks with a 9 credit load. I managed to get by, but feel that I could have gotten much more out of my classes and research had I been able to devote more hours to them and not to the humdrum of daily work-related tasks.

Thus, my current position. I'm headed into another 9 credit semester, 3 of those being devoted to thesis research and writing, and 3 of them at another DC area institution where I really want to make a good impression (with hopes of applying to their PhD program). It's pretty clear to me that I won't be able to keep up a 32 hour a week work schedule, 10 hr RA, and 9 hours of course work throughout this coming year and achieve what I've set out to achieve in the academic realm. Beyond that, our little company has gone through a merger in the last year and corporate culture here is changing in ways that make it, for me at least, a less and less pleasant place to be.

Hence, I've been on the hunt for a new position. I've already been passed over for two 20hr GA positions in student life, which I may or may not have been well qualified for, and I've currently got applications in for 2 other university positions - one in the library at yet another DC school and one in an admin position in a human rights group associated with one of the area law schools - and a handful of part time non-profit jobs. At this point, however, I'm feeling that I'm down to the wire, and I'm just slightly freaked out by the prospect of either 1) remaining in my current position for the coming year or 2) being jobless as the semester starts (an option I don't think is really an option at all).

So, my remaining (if there are any) wise and worldly readers (to borrow from turn of phrase from Dean Dad), any advise or at least a story? What did you all do during grad school, if you went. How did those jobs work out? What types of jobs would you suggest looking for...keeping in mind that I have no retail or serving experience besides being a pro-shop attendant and bartender at a tiny golf club.

A Sad, Sad Day

SteveG says it better than I'd ever be able to.

For my part, I'll just say that I'm definitely going to miss his incredibly intelligent, absolutely hilarious commentary on American life. The first real exposure to Carlin I can recall is on a field trip to Chicago in 8th grade where my roommates and I sat up until 3 or 4 in the morning watching a marathon of Carlin specials on HBO...quite possibly the beginning of my love of stand-up comedy. I had the chance about two years ago to see the master at work at Warner Theater here in DC, and I'm glad that wasn't an opportunity missed. George, we'll miss you.

Just Scattered Thoughts

Nothing coherent to say today, but there are some interesting things floating around in cyberworld that have got my mind churning:

This morning on NPR, there was a piece on "no email Fridays," which has sent the tone for today's thoughts about our "connectedness" and what this might mean for epistemological inquiry.

Following this same line of thought is a piece in a new-ish blog called The Scholarly Kitchen linked to by Inside Higher Ed. Philip Davis ponders whether or not Google is making him more stupid and concludes that it has, to the contrary, made him smarter by giving him more connections to "more documents, artifacts, and people" that, in turn, have an influence on his thinking and writing.

The post is in response to another very interesting article in Atlantic Monthly titled "Is Google Making Us Stupid?". Nicholas Carr, the author of this article, reaches a different conclusion from Davis, claiming that "the Net" has led us away from deep thinking and brought about a sort of attention deficit disorder in us all. My favorite line: "My mind now expects to take in information the way the Net distributes it: in a swiftly moving stream of particles. Once I was a scuba diver in the sea of words. Now I zip along the surface like a guy on a Jet Ski."

Finally, Piss Poor Prof at Burnt Out Adjunct connects to this theme with thoughts on an Inside Higher Ed story about "Googling" and undergrad research: "Google is not research."

I can't pretend to tie all this together in a coherent way, but, for my benefit more than yours (whoever you are) here are some questions I see lurking that I might pursue further down the line:

Does the old definition of knowledge (some variation on "justified true belief") still work in the internet paradigm? Knowledge in this way assumes an individual knower, but there seems to be a vast resource of social knowledge that is literally at our fingertips. When I'm asked "Do you know X?," I no longer need to answer "No, I don't know," now I can answer "I'll Google (or Wikipedia) it." Is this different than being able to recall from one's memory? When information is accessed instantaneously on a laptop or BlackBerry, it seems much closer to memory than to a book found in the library stacks. What kind of work are social epistemologists doing here?

What's the difference between knowledge and information? Is it the structure, the undergirding? Is it that knowledge is believed or justified that sets it apart? We can believe information or disbelieve it. Information can be true or false. But it does seem to have justification (or warrant, or something of this sort).

What's the difference between knowing and understanding? I know the equation for energy (energy=mass x the square of the speed of light), but I don't really understand how/why that equation works. Do know things that I access online as soon as I access them if I'm warranted in believing them? Even if I don't understand them?

How are all of these questions touched by the vast amounts of information we can access at a moment's notice on the internet?

Taxation and Republican Talking Points

On her show yesterday morning, Diane Rehm had a conversation with Rep. Tom Cole (R - Oklahoma), the current Deputy Whip and Chair of the NRCC. As expected, he stuck to the talking points without the slightest deviation. The one that caught my attention this go-round was his insistence that American voters have a simple decision to make when it comes to tax policy and the presidential election. I won't deny that in my mind this decision is fairly simple, but I do question his framing of the discussion. According to Cole:

Option 1: A vote for Barack Obama amounts to a vote to raise the aggregate tax burden on the tax-paying population. Irrespective of the portion of the population that is asked to bear this burden, Cole claims, increased taxes will stagnate economic growth.

Option 2: A vote for John McCain amounts to a vote for lower the tax burden across the board. This move stimulates consumption in the lower-to-middle income brackets and investment in the upper income brackets thus stimulating economic growth.

The gist of it is something like this: Obama = higher total tax burden = slow down; McCain = lower total tax burden = growth. The problem here is with the middle term, a total or aggregate tax burden really doesn't tell us much about possibilities for economic growth. On the surface, it assumes that the burden is evenly distributed (or, maybe equitably distributed) and that more money in consumer/investor pockets means higher consumption/investment and economic growth.

Digging a little deeper, though, there's a further assumption in the Republican rhetoric that really drives this type of tax policy. This is the assumption that it's really the upper echelon of income earners who drive the economy. Their investment leads to job growth and rising incomes across the board. If this is the case, a lower tax burden on them will mean that they have more money to invest which will spur economic growth. This is supply side economics.

The trouble is that effective demand, not supply, drives the markets. Greater investment in times of economic slowdown would be an irrational investment strategy. Investors can't expect returns on their investments, and, if they did invest and supply did rise, there would be a glut of overproduction and a downward economic spiral would ensue. Cutting taxes on the rich in an economic downturn doesn't spur the economy, it just makes them richer. They won't invest in projects that spur the economy or innovation (they know it's irrational), instead they'll save (effectively, by investing in government securities and other stable assets).

Raising the aggregate tax burden by targeting taxes at the wealthy will not harm economic growth, but lower taxes on the middle and lower classes (as well as better government services) made up for by higher taxes on the richest of the rich will increase effective demand and ease an economy out of recession. Rehm tried to say something like this to Cole, but being a Party loyalist, he didn't budge and continued to insist that aggregate tax burdens have some meaning beyond rhetoric. He's wrong.

A Little Meta-Philosophy

Brian Leiter links to an interesting Eurozine article entitled "Modes of Philosophizing: A Round Table Debate." The article portrays a Q&A between Cogito (apparently Eurozines in-house philosopher extraordinaire) and Raymond Geuss (Cambridge), Jonathan Barnes (emeritus Paris-Sorbonne), Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge/emeritus Oxford), and Barry Stroud (Berkeley). The answers are fairly interesting all around, though, as Leiter points out, a few are dismissive (he thinks appropriately so, I think not). In any case, I don't want to take issue here with what was said by these respected Professors and Emeruti. Instead, I'd like to put my novice skills to use and see if a newbie like myself can say anything interesting in response to these questions:

Question one:

Do you think that philosophy as pursued by philosophers has something to say which is, or should be, of some relevance to the way non-philosophers think about the world and their life? Is it desirable that philosophers make an effort to make those aspects of philosophy which are relevant in this way available to non-philosophers?

The short answer: Yes and yes. But it's more complicated than that. (We're philosophers, why wouldn't it be?) We must first clarify just who these non-philosophers are. There are some who have much to learn from philosophy in their professional lives: lawyers, judges, research scientists, doctors, legislators...all of these professions - just to name a few - can take something away from studies in different areas of philosophy. Philosophy of science, philosophy of law, ethics...the way philosophers go about doing work in these fields sheds light on questions that are very pertinent in some professional endeavors. I have a hunch, though, that this isn't what the question is really asking.

Now, if we're talking about whether philosophy has something to offer outside of certain professional endeavors the answers get a bit murky, and one's definition of philosophy has much to do with it. Logic chopping and exegesis on arcane texts has little if any value to non-philosopher folks. It seems that sometimes we work ourselves into tight little corners where we ourselves have trouble seeing the relevance of the work we're doing. But this isn't all that there is to academic philosophy, there are also those working in fields that do address (directly or indirectly) the "big questions" about life, god, etc, that we all - human beings, not just philosophers - come to wonder about from time to time. Philosophers and the work we do can, I think, provide new and interesting ways for everyone to approach these ponderings. And, of course, there's also critical race theory, feminist theory, queer theory, successor system theory, deconstructionism, etc, that all have strong philosophical theory underpinning them which find mainstream popularity and are useful when accompanied by real-world practice.

As for the second part...OF COURSE! All philosophy should be made accessible to non-philosophers. All information of this sort should be made accessible...and free.

Question two:

Should philosophy be pursued only by those trained in philosophy? Are there clear criteria that have to be observed and respected by anyone outside the academic institutions who wants to claim that he/she is engaged in doing philosophy?

Again, this is going to hinge on our definition of philosophy. If we define it only as the academic endeavor of reading, studying, contemplating, writing, and getting published...well, it's hard to do that if you're untrained in the field. You're also likely to re-invent the wheel...or, you know, something more philosophically useful than a wheel, hopefully...if you're not familiar with the field. However, if we go broader and think of philosophy as the love of wisdom as the word's etymology would have us do, then anyone who's struck by the profundity and baffled by the complexity of life's great questions can be engaged in a philosophical endeavor. Why should we be so elitist? Many of the greatest among philosophers weren't trained in the field: Socrates and Wittgenstein to name a couple.

Question three:

Should academic teachers of philosophy consider themselves philosophers in virtue of the fact that they teach philosophy? Or should we reserve the title of a philosopher only for Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Wittgenstein, and the like?

Those who teach philosophy are likely much better at teaching it if they are actively engaged in it (and, please, tell me how they got a job if they're not). How is one to get students engaged if you yourself are not interested and working on answering some questions. If we restate the question and ask whether all of those who do think of themselves as philosophers (those who are teaching, publishing, engaged in the dialog, etc.) actually are philosophers we might have a more interesting discussion.

One way to think about this restated question is in reference to Kuhn's paradigm shift theory of scientific progress. Plato, Kant, Wittgenstein, and the rest of those big names where doing what we might call revolutionary philosophy (though it's obviously up for debate how revolutionary any of them really were) much like the revolutionary science of a Newton or Einstein. This doesn't mean that the rest of us poor schmucks aren't doing philosophy at all. They've set the paradigms, we're solving the puzzles in them...doing "normal philosophy," if you will. Now, I'm sure some would disagree with this analogy, but there are other ways to think through this and still come up with the answer that, of course, philosophy profs (and grad students?) are philosophers, too.

Question four:

"Although the history of philosophy – despite what many historians like to say – is no more a part of philosophy than the history of mathematics is a part of mathematics, nonetheless you can't do anything much in the history of a subject without having some sort of acquaintance with the subject itself." (J. Barnes) Do you agree?

Are historians of philosophy philosophers, too? Sure they are. I agree with Barnes that to do history of philosophy (or any subject, for that matter) one must be at least somewhat familiar and skilled with philosophy itself. One needs to understand the questions being asked in order to understand the history of their asking.

Question five:

What about the reverse? Can one do anything much in philosophy without having some sort of acquaintance with its history?

One can, most can't. There are those brilliant few who can just see the logical structure of a language, perceive the misunderstandings in a theory, or grasp what knowledge is without doing the difficult work of figuring out what everyone before her thought, but there are many of those. Even they will, at some point, need to acquaint themselves with some of the history if they want to be at all sure that their brilliant breakthrough wasn't accomplished 200 years prior.
The rest of us, we don't stand a chance without learning a good deal of the history.

Question six:

Many philosophers nowadays work in particular areas of philosophy without taking an active interest, or without being interested at all in others. To make it clearer, philosophers working on ethics or political philosophy often do not concern themselves with, or even express an aversion to, areas of philosophy such as philosophy of logic or language, and the other way around. What do you think about this compartmentalization of philosophy?

In one respect, compartmentalization is unavoidable. There's simply too much literature out there and too much new stuff being produced for one person to keep up on the whole of philosophy. One needs to keep a keen eye on one's areas of specialization in order to be able to contribute to the discussion. It's understandable that one would then not keep on top of developments in other areas, as there are only 24 hours in a day.

On the other hand, it's important to not lose sight of the forest for the trees, as they say. Developments in other areas may be of interest in one's own, and even if they are not, some are of enough general interest that one ought to be aware of them (if not well-read on them). I think that we all have a lot to learn from each other, and to spurn an entire branch of the field is to preempt the opportunity for possible fruitful developments. You'll also be better at small talk at the APA.

Question seven:

During the last decades there has been a debate, sometimes quite polemical, between the so-called "analytical" and "continental" philosophers. Should one say that the representatives of the one or the other tradition are not philosophers at all, or do they represent different modes of philosophizing?

I'm not sure I know what "modes of philosophizing" means. Continentals and analytics tend to approach the world in different ways, but let's not get confused, both are doing something called philosophy. I can look at a ball and call it red, you can look at it and call it round...we've both had a sense experience of the ball. The world's a tricky thing to observe and grasp, and no one can say that their way is the absolute only way to do it. Until one can, then we're all doing philosophy. Again, we have a lot to learn from each other.

And the finale:

Throughout the history of philosophy philosophers have used different forms of expressing their views such as dialogues, letters, poems, questions and answers, commentaries, aphorisms. It seems that we have long stopped experimenting in this area and most philosophers choose to write articles and books of a standard form. Does this standardization involve a loss?

Whether or not standardization involves a loss in the sense of meaningful philosophical inquiry is a question far beyond my reach, but I do think that we've lost some style, some panache, if you will. Philosophy, like all academic disciplines, has had to fall in line with the capitalistic paradigm of be productive or be gone. For the philosopher it's a matter of publish or perish, and no journals are publishing poems these days. In my opinion, the discipline has become to corporate, all of academia has. But I don't know if that involves a meaningful loss of content.

State Games: An Incredible Experience

KM and I made the trip this weekend up to State College, PA, to see her sister play and her parents coach at the Pennsylvania Special Olympics State Games. KM's an old pro at these events, but I was a first timer for something of this size and caliber. I've volunteered at a basketball event before and a few weekly bowling practices, but I've never before had the privelage of being surrounded by so many amazing athletes and volunteers. The atmosphere, the competition, the sportsmanship, and so many other aspects just blew me away.

KM's little sister, CM, is the catcher for our hometown's softball team (her Dad's the coach), and when we arrived just after the start of the first game, CM and the team were excited to see us. Most of the athletes already new KM and a few recognized me, but we both got a warm welcome even though they were in the heat of competition with the team recognized as one of the best in the state. CM's team, unfortunately, lost this game, but they'd won two on Friday. Their 2-2 record was enough to get them the Silver Medal this year, but this weekend wasn't just about winning.

I work in a strange amorphous area between the for-profit and non-profit sectors, so I spend a good portion of my day dealing with and thinking about charitable organizations. I'd come to believe that the gifts that do the greatest good are the gifts that produce tangible benefit for the greatest number of individuals in need, but after this weekend's experiences I have a newfound appreciation for the amazing work that organizations can do in making what look to be small differences in a few people's lives. Special Olympics is one of these organizations. They don't build homes, help disaster victims, or feed the hungry, but they make a significant and incredible contribution to the wellbeing of both the individuals who get a chance to compete and the coaches and families who are priveleged to be a part of the experience.

Special Olympics athletes get more out of competing (on a team or as individuals) than just the thrill of a victory. These athletes get to be a part of something in a way that they don't normally get to experience. They are the in-crowd for a few days, the centers of attention in a very meaningful way. Coaches and families witness a personality change when these athletes take the field. They become competitive, but at the same time they look out for one another and pick eachother up. They cheer on their teammates and they cheer on those with whom they're competing - even if it means a run is going to be scored against them. Some of them take leadership roles: they keep up team morale, help coaches keep the team organized, pick up teammates after a tough play and congratulate them after a great one. These athletes don't have this opportunity anywhere else in their lives, and the responsibility that comes with being a leader shows through in their held-high heads and light-up the room smiles. They thrive - like so many of us do - on being the go-to-person.

Not everyone's a leader, though. Those that aren't still support their teammates and fellow competitors and play just as hard. We saw a few homeruns and some great catches made that become the talk of the rest of the afternoon - proud smiles and high fives all around. These athletes gain self-esteem, learn to cope with losses and be humble in victory, learn to be good sports and work their hardest for the win and for eachother. These are life lessons that many of us who have played a sport take for granted, but lessons many of these amazing athletes never had the chance to learn. Special Olympics gives them that.

Beyond the field of competition, there's also an incredible comradery that arises among these athletes. Most of them compete year after year and shouted "Hello"s and big hugs abound around the Olympic Village. Some incredible benefactors provide all sorts of games, prizes, and free food and drinks for the athletes as they hang out and spend time with their friends. There was even a dunking booth and karaoke - there was no shyness here as some of the athletes belted out their favorite 80s rock tunes.

All in all, I'm so glad that KM and I were able to make the trip. CM and her teammates appreciated having us there, but I also gained a new appreciation and respect for the organization, the hundreds of volunteers and coaches, and the many benefactors who make this type of event a possibility. No, they're not building houses or handing out food, but they're building self-esteem, strengthening personalities, providing an athletic outlet, and providing an incredible form of positive feedback for individuals who wouldn't ordinarily have this opportunity. The Special Olympics is an amazing organization.

We Are Creatures of Habit

Honestely, what did they expect to find? Of course people travel the same routes day after day, frequent the same locations, and communicate with many of the same people. Habit seems too simplistic a term to describe what's happening here, however. Social relations seem to be one place to turn for an explanation, but digging deeper, economics is what these researchers are really observing.

Why do people travel the same route fairly consistently? Well, as my friend aptly put it: "I go home because that's where my stuff is. I go to work so I can buy more stuff." What's important to realize, however, is that though this is a charecteristic pattern that's likely to emerge to some degree in any economic system (that is, we are likely to still travel within a fairly limited degree of variation) it's one that is exaggerated in the capitalist economic order by a number of factors:

1) Capitalism requires long working hours that decrease "leisure" time in which we might travel or veer from our normal patterns.

2) We are typically confined to working in a specialized job with little chance for learning new skills or variation in our days.

3) We are constrained by the need to always be productive in order to provide for basic needs of survival. This decreases "leisure" time and also dictates the patterns in which we travel: work, home, work, home, etc.

There are many other factors at play here, of course, but Marx envisioned a socialist working environment that allowed for flexibility (a laborer might fish in the morning, weave baskets in the afternoon, and write a book in the evening...of course, update this for today's technology, but you get the picture) that capitalism simply cannot facilitate.

Just something to ponder...the patterns of our lives are governed by economic principles, i.e., capitalist economic principles.

Loyalty in Politics

A friend said something along these lines in a conversation today: ideals such as loyalty and truth have no place in American politics.

Thinking about this sentiment, I question whether loyalty ever really has (or ought to have) a place in politics (where politics is the work of governing and legislating, not simply running for office). Loyalty, it seems, is the quality of being in some way devoted to the well-being/good of another person or persons. This is not some mysterious quality, though, that is hidden from our view. We recognize it through certain characteristics that are outwardly observable. That is, we call someone loyal when she has demonstrated her loyalty to another in some real situation. It makes no sense, then, to talk of loyalty as if it is some indwelling or inherent quality of a person; some constituent of a virtuous character. Loyalty lies in the act of being loyal to someone or something.

It seems that talk of a "loyal person" is confused and misleading for that person is loyaly only when loyalty is directed at someone or something. "She is loyal to...", etc. But not simply "she is loyal." A loyal person may be labelled as such when she is loyal to me, or loyal to her friends, loyal to her country, or loyal to the crown, but she cannot just be loyal.

But, then, why oughtn't loyalty be a political virtue? Do we not desire those in office to be devoted to the good and well-being of some other? ...These are the wrong questions, I think. Instead, ask to whom or what politicians ought to display this devotion. Should a politician be loyal to her constituents? To those who gave large donations and supported her campaign? To those who have voted with her in the past? To her party? To her family? To her own ideals? To her country as an idea? To the country's citizenry as a whole? When we ask the question this way, it becomes clear that loyalty to one might very well be inimical to loyalty to another. The interests of all of these factions do not often align, yet each seems to have a claim to the politician's loyalty for some legitimite reasons.

Loyalty seems to be the wrong virtue here, as it must always be directed at someone or something and in being such, it must always be directed at the expense of someone or something else. Loyalty might actually be a political vice in this light. There are many other virtues we might ask of our politicians: honesty, commitment to the best course of action for all parties involved (utility), patience, etc; but loyalty does not seem, in my mind, to fit among these.

Now, I would not go so far to question whether loyalty is ever a virtuous quality. In a platoon on a battle field, in a friendship, on a team...in these situations it plays an important role. What is different here is the game. The games played in these latter situations is one in which the object of loyalty is already defined; it is set forth before the game begins. In politics, this is not so. Here many interests are competing, and it would be detrimental for the politician to declare loyalty to one at the cost of all the others.

Letters to the Editor

This little nugget of...well...let's just call it a nugget, comes to us from the Bedford Gazette letter to the editor section today. Gotta love my hometown paper:

"It seems wisdom in this country has been replaced with an unhealthy reverence of knowledge. But knowledge is only facts and figures, a tool not the answer"

On the first read, this just makes you cringe, doesn't it? What is wisdom? It seems that maybe in this sense it's synonymous with dogma or, possibly, received tradition, which, in this letter writer's mind, is dichotomously opposed to knowledge. He goes on to say that the US government would do well to heed to the "good counsel" of the Bible, so apparently this is where wisdom lies and knowledge (presumably falsifiable scientific claims) leads us astray of this (or at best acts in an instrumental fashion). After all, knowledge consists of only facts and figures and those can't guide us in our political/moral motives.

Sounds a little scary, "an unhealthy reverence of knowledge," but is there a charitable reading to be made of this? It might be possible to read a Humean insight into what we find here, that one can't derrive an ought from an is. Maybe reason, that which produces demonstrative knowledge, is only instrumental. If that's the case, in some sense, knowledge is only a tool and cannot provide "the answer" to questions of what we ought to do. But even so, can wisdom in the sense of tradition or religious teaching? Certainly not in Hume's view, there the passions rule. It seems we can only put a slight varnish on this claim, but never salvage it completely.

What do you think? Utter nonsese, scary rhetoric, or a diamond of "wisdom" in the rough?

What does it "mean" to consume data?

Yesterday, NYT ran an article on speculations about the new iPhone. The focus was obviously on new features, gadgets, widgets, and whatnots, but a few paragraphs at the end struck me as a little strange:

IPhone users have turned out to be prodigious consumers of wireless data. For example, the iPhone customers of T-Mobile, the German cellular operator, consume 30 times more data than its other wireless customers, according to Chetan Sharma, an independent wireless industry analyst.

Mr. Sharma estimates that iPhone users in the United States consume two and a half to three times more data than users of other cellphones. Faster networks could widen that gap and further extend the iPhone’s influence in the telecommunications world.

What does it mean to say, "iPhone users consume more data?" More simply, what does it mean to say that one comsumes data? This seems a strange way to put these words - consume and data - to use. What does the verb to consume mean? Well, let's look at how it's used. We use the word in sentences like (1) "The fire grows in intensity as it consumes oxygen" and "The fire is consuming the house" and "I've consumed one too many tacos and two too many beers." In this way, consuming is analogous to or synonymous with ingesting: taking in, breaking down, and using for some purpose. Another way we use the word is its noun form consumer. Here we see constructs like (2) "a gasoline consumer" and "the consumer in such-and-such a market." This is synonymous with words like buyer or purchaser. Another way consumer is used is in the term (3) "consumer of information." This could be synonymous with (2), but doesn't seem to be because we don't normally talk of information consumers - say someone browsing Wikipedia - as buying information. In this sense it seems like a consumer is someone who uses, maybe digests in a sense, but not in the same way as (1).

(1) and (2) also seem to not be synonymous, but is there an analogy, a family resemblence for this concept? If I buy something am I a consumer in a similar way as I am a consumer of cheese when I eat it? There is some sense of taking the object of consumption as one's own, of taking it in. But the similarity breaks down here.

What of consuming data, though? Getting back to where we began, consuming data seems to be most analogous to (3), but not quite. What's the difference here? When we're talking about information, we're talking about data in some distilled form, e.g., a proposition, but data itself is simply bytes of 0s and 1s coming across the airwaves. Do we consume these more like (1)? Do we take them in, break them down, and re-construct them in more useful ways like fire does with oxygen? If this is the case, what are we saying when we say they "consume more data?" Is it like eating more? If it is, is that a good thing? Are we gaining something from it, or is it simply gluttony. Are we overconsuming data?

A bit rambling, but what do you all think? What does it "mean" to be consuming data?

Thank God for Winter Break

So I'm sure I have no readers left out there...all 3 of you have probably long given up, but I just have to say that I am so happy that it's December 17 and I handed in at 5pm today my final final paper of the semester! The last 3-4 weeks have been absolutely grueling, but they're done! Don't get me wrong, I'm loving grad school, but one of the best parts about writing a paper is handing it in, and I'm so ready for a break...now if I just didn't have this pesky job to go to, haha.

In any case...reflections on my first semester:

1. Grad school ain't easy. When they say read, they mean read; and when they say read 300 pgs by next Weds, they don't just mean the first 10 and the last 10. I think I read more pages in the last semester than in my 4 undergrad years combined. And writing...let's just say it had been a while since I'd put pen to paper (ok, no one does that anymore, but you know what I mean) and it took a while to get back into the swing, but it wasn't all that bad...

2. Being a research assistant is interesting...sometimes. But when the prof you're working for buys a new edition of SdB's The Coming of Age that just so happens to be numbered COMPLETELY differently than the previous edition and she's already read and taken notes on half the book...well, finding quotations and writing up page numbers is not the most thrilling thing I can think of. Besides that little charade it was definitely a great learning experience, and I'm glad to take it on again next semester...but w/ a prof who's focus is Ancient?? Parmenides is not quite my forte, but we'll see.

3. The quirky prof who teaches pomo thought...there's a reason his office is actually a closet. He wears a jacket to class and complains that it hot, a hat w/ ear flaps, and busts a sag. Not to mention the key ring that he must have inherited from the janitor who passed away last year... But he is an interesting fellow w/ some thoughts....just don't ask him "What's up?" when he gives you a strange look across the room....his answer: "Is that a trick question?"

4. As an undergrad, everyone feared how the prof would react to their final presentation to the class. As a grad student, everyone fears how the girl who seems to know exactly how to tear every argument, even her own, to shreds might react. The black knee high boots w/ too high heels add to the persona.

5. Reading for fun...hahahahahaha! It took me an entire semester to get through Restaurant at the End of the Universe! It took me one and a half days to read Hitchhikers Guide...hmmm.

Now it's on to semester two featuring:
1) Marx's Critical Social Theory - used to love him, still like some, some's in question...guess we'll see.

2) Current Issues in Theory of Knowledge - a focus on Alvin Plantinga...lotta catching up to do in this one and it hasn't even started.

3) Philosophical Figures: Hume - they say I have to take a modern course...

These three should play nice together...well, except Marx...always gotta be one troublemaker.

Thoughts on Women's Rights as Human Rights

How is one to envision the body of ideas that constitutes international human rights in terms of both the universality of human rights and the particularity, or plurality, of various cultures, religions, nations and tribes vying for their right to self-determination?

Not more than twenty-five yards from the door to my office is the entrance to the Embassy of Pakistan – Interest Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This office handles all visa, passport, student, and cultural affairs for Iranian citizens residing in the Washington, DC, area. At any time during the day I might walk down toward the elevator and see this scene unfold: a woman steps into the hall in average American dress. She may be in jeans and a t-shirt or donning a business suit, but inevitably, draped over her arm is a long, concealing coat. As she steps off the elevator, she will slide her arms into the sleeves of the coat, reach into her bag and unravel a scarf. As she walks toward the door of the office the scarf is wrapped about her head, concealing her dark hair. She dare not enter the Interest Section with any evidence of a female form visible to the eye. If I happen to step out a while later, I may catch this same woman leaving the building and shedding her makeshift burka as she enters back into her Western life.

Daily, I ponder the ritual of these women. Such a stark contrast exists between the lives they live, and those which they must portray in front of their own government officials. How is one to understand this divide? This, admittedly, is a mild form of the rift between what a Westerner would consider the universal human right to self-expression in dress and what an Islamic state would consider its particular right to cultural self-determination, but it is a ready example of a much deeper issue that I would like to explore – the gap between the ideal of universal human rights and the ideal of cultural diversity.

“Pluralism envisions a state that allows a thousand flowers to bloom (180).” These words of Coomaraswamy describe the vision of a heterogeneous society in which many traditions are allowed to flourish side by side with respect for one another’s differences like the flowers of a colorful garden. The pluralism, though, that is revealed in such a garden at once and always conceals. Hidden within this ideal of diversity of traditions is the hegemony of each culture which consumes the pluralism of individuals within itself.

Another formulation from Coomaraswamy: “If all women are equal, then why do Muslim women have different rights from Hindu women, or Malay women from Chinese women (180)?” Defining human rights contingently in relation to cultural norms seems inherently problematic if one is to call them human rights at all. The term human, though not historically inclusive, in this iteration seems an attempt at a radical inclusiveness, an attempt to define us all as having this one trait in common – our humanness. The term “human rights” then seeks to endow each of us in our humanness with some certain set of rights that on the basis of our humanness cannot be denied. It seems inherently a universal concept.

Of these various rights, though, a few that seem near the pinnacle are that right of self-determination, that right of religious freedom (but freedom to practice, freedom to cede one’s freedoms to it? freedom here seems already problematic), and that right of a community to band together and define itself as a culture. And should not the culture or the religion that rises as a result of these rights be respected by those outside of it? It seems to follow. But if this culture or this religion demands that members forgo certain of their rights as necessary to the rite of membership, and say that certain of these forgone rights are of the nature of what have been called “human rights,” then does the community outside have a cause to protest? Do the human rights of the individual or the rights of the culture or religion to which the individual originally ceded their rights take precedent here?

The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action’s universality clause, as the result of much negotiation reads:

While the significance of national and regional peculiarities and various historical, cultural, and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of states, regardless of their political, economic, and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

This ambiguous declaration leaves one still with the lingering question of universality or particularity. Particular histories “must be borne in mind” as the state carries out its duty to “promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.” What does this “borne in mind” mean? Should the state punish murder unless it is in the form of religious ritual? How far does the particular, the peculiar, extend into the universal? How much of the relative is submitted to the universality of human rights? This declaration seems to be utterly empty of practicable meaning.

Women’s rights groups have thought out other solutions to this dilemma through a discussion of consent. Coomaraswamy writes: “Women and men should be given the right to choose which law should govern their private lives. If they wish to be governed by Muslim law, that is their prerogative; but if they wish to be guided by general secular law, that should also be a right granted to the individual (181).” This voluntarism is problematic in a couple of ways. At the same time as one recognizes the right of a religion to determine itself, one denies the very same right to a state. At what point is this line drawn? Should a village traditionally of a certain culture that precludes certain rights of the individual be asked to also find room within it for those individuals who would not submit to the cession of those rights? If the individual should decide she would prefer the secular law to govern her actions, must she move from the village? From the state? Does this not place undue burden on the individual if she should prefer a different life than that allowed by the culture, the religion, the village, the state?

Even without this undue burden, even if the village must make room for the individual, there is the question of what kind of choice really exists. Do not traditions by their very nature hold on to individuals? To ask it another way, is it not the case that one is indoctrinated into a tradition, a culture, a religion, in such a way that makes it, in many cases, extremely difficult to leave, even if the illusion of this freedom exists at the surface? The consent to be governed in a way that would preclude one’s human rights seems to be an impossible consent to withhold in many situations, and such a system appears to leave unanswered the question of where space must be made for the individual who chooses to live outside of the dominant group.

Why not whole-hearted universality? Born of the Enlightenment, universal human rights hold within them an inherent bias. It is claimed by the Third World that these rights are Western, not universal (168). These rights are formulations born of a particular lived situation, and cannot be applied to all particular lived situations. It is rightly the case that these universal human rights are of a Western imagination rising out of a modern epistemology which seeks to objectify in order to know and to universalize the entirety of its knowledge. At the same time, these human rights were not universal to all in Western society in their initial instance. The exclusivity of the term “human” has been relaxed; bringing far greater numbers into the set to which these rights apply. Indeed, the women’s movement has had great influence in opening up this term. Also, the term “rights” has undergone many alterations. The universal (Western) human rights have been expanded to include rights of women that were never imagined by the framers of the Enlightenment. Does this tell us something of the nature of human rights born of the Enlightenment that is of importance to this debate?

It seems that the particular of the Western idea of human rights is one that is inherently subject to change via the re-iteration of a certain type of dialog. The constant reverberation of reasoned and rational dialog that is inherent to the Western modern epistemology brings about a constant re-evaluation and revaluation of human rights. The ideas and ideals contained within the term are continually open to re-examination. New ideas and ideals are packaged within the borders of the term as old definitions are left by way. Open, honest, and rational dialog, then, seems of utmost importance in the debate. The particular of Western (Enlightenment) human rights may not be universal, but it opens itself up to the type of dynamic change that allows it to continually grow in that direction.

Does this lead, then, to a universal human rights that consumes the particulars, the relative, of local cultures? It seems not to be the case. To say that it is assumes local customs, culture, religions, and the like to be static, un-evolving constructions. All systems are subject to change, to evolution. There is an incessant interplay between world cultures that unfolds at a feverish pace today. We are not confined to our villages, but, instead, it seems more the cases that the world is our village. To say that cultures around the world are becoming Westernized is to miss the dialog that is happening. Local cultures are not now the same as they were a hundred years ago and they will not be a hundred years hence what they are today. The same can be said of human rights.

The women down the hall have stepped outside of their particular culture and into the realm of the particularly Western iteration of human rights. They still must don the cloak of their culture for certain of their interactions. Only a continuing dialog, a critical dialog, will discover what balance between those stark contrasts will unfold tomorrow and twenty years from tomorrow. We, today, are obligated to keep alive that very dialog.

Redefinition and Wollstonecraft’s Dilemma

Since the inception of the liberal-democratic state, woman has found herself buried deep in the depths of the institution’s patriarchal structure. She is confined to a sphere outside the sphere where individuals are seen to interact economically, politically, and even socially, to a greater or lesser degree. We find her as an ideal in the kitchen, the nursery, the bedroom of our archetypal home, not living life as the free and social being she, like man, is. For well over two centuries now she has fought within the theoretical framework of the liberal-democracy – and especially within the framework of the welfare state – for her emancipation from this house arrest. Working within these bounds she has encountered many obstacles, but one of the greatest dilemmas she has faced is that the patriarchal, fraternal structure of the system precludes in its basic assumptions the possibility of her ever being something even so basic as an individual, let alone a full citizen. Each and every time women try to rise out of this culturally imposed role of the second-tier citizen and assert themselves as full citizens of the state they encounter the paradox that “women in civil society must disavow [their] bodies and act as part of the brotherhood [in order to be seen as citizens] – but since [they] are never regarded as other than women, [they] must simultaneously continue to affirm the patriarchal conception of femininity, or patriarchal subjection (Pateman 52).”

We must, first and foremost, keep in mind that liberal-democratic theory and, hence, the liberal-democratic welfare state have developed not in a vacuum but hand in hand with Western capitalist society (Pateman 145). This recognition is of vital importance because it allows us to realize, in a sense, that liberal theory is not solely revolutionary in nature (though one must also recognize that it is a reaction to the paternalistic governments of the time), but is, instead, a justification of the status quo of the capitalist market economy. The theory, in essence, provides the groundwork for the myth of the citizen through its championing of ‘universal’ enfranchisement. If all are provided the opportunity to vote, the idea goes, then the political elite will be held to the public will by the myth itself (Pateman 147). It is granted from the beginning that the elite will be the only true political actors in society, rotating in power, but never ceding it. Rawls goes so far as to say that while the well-to-do, active in political life have a “political obligation” to the state, the masses simply have a “natural duty to obey” (Pateman 67). Part of this natural duty is a resignation to the tedium of daily routine and political inactivity for the good of the state.

The idea presented here is that the majority of life unfolds in the private (with a lowercase “p” which will be discussed later) sphere. The masses are consumers above all else, paradoxically both the drivers and passengers of the market economy. They purchase and sell, work and play, sleep and eat in the private sphere with little regard for the politics of the state (the sphere of public life), but all the while, by virtue of simply ignoring the political and going about their business, the masses consent to this political realm and fulfill their civic duty. Locke referred to the acceptance of the institutions of the state as “tacit consent” in his voluntarist framework (Pateman 63). What is neglected in this picture is the fact that this private sphere, the home of the individual, of Homo economicus, all the while, through all these activities, resides to some great degree within the Public sphere.

We have created two dichotomies where theorists had once seen only one. The capital-P Public sphere, once the sphere of man, of the individual with political and productive power, has cleaved to reveal the little-p public and private spheres, the spheres of government and economy, which are found at the locus of most discussions of the public versus the private. Governments are asked to stand out of private matters such as the exchange of goods and the growth of business unless some grave concern should arise. This shift has left another conversation by the wayside. The capital-P Private sphere has all but been ignored. Yes, we hope the government respects our privacy by not listening to our phone calls, but this is as much a private (economic) concern as a Private concern. Only in discussions of child rearing and sexual relations does the Private sphere assert itself in the face of the Public.

The Private sphere is where we finally find women obscured deep within this liberal-democratic structure. Nestled here in this realm, women have all but been pushed out of the conversation since the time of Locke through the late 19^th to early 20^th century. Here in this realm is where we begin to see the depth of the questions facing feminism and the hurdles standing in front of women in doing something so seemingly simple as asserting themselves as individuals.

Throughout the history of the welfare state (named as such in 1939, but really throughout the history of liberal-democracy) the Private sphere has been largely ignored as relevant to the political state yet has also been the focus, paradoxically, of many of its policies (Pateman 179). Men have been seen as the breadwinners (citizens) and, hence, the contributors to the welfare state. They produce value through their labor in the private-Public sector and pay taxes for the public-Public good. By virtue of this contribution, men are also the seen as the rightful recipients of the welfare state’s goodwill. It is assumed that women benefit only through their benevolent husbands and fathers (Pateman 188). Women, hence, are not provided the opportunity to do that which is central to the idea of citizenship in the welfare state: work. Women are not seen to be owners of their own persons, and are not able to bring their persons to market in the form of labor (Pateman 186).

Women have, however, through various feminist movements, brought many of their needs to the attention of the state. They have taken the place of the majority in regards to the receipt of welfare (Pateman 180). In their place in the home, women are seen to provide, in some sense, welfare to the state as welfare to the family. They are caregivers of children, the elderly, and the infirm, and, as such, have asserted their rights as, at least, formal citizens of the welfare state and demanded some compensation for this work. But this, as we shall see, has only added to the paradoxical place of women as citizens.

Pateman, in her essay The Patriarchal Welfare State, provides us with a useful idea in what she terms as Wollstonecraft’s Dilemma. Women have sought, as was laid out by Wollstonecraft, two routes to citizenship which both turn out to be “incompatible” with the very structure and nature of the patriarchal welfare state. The first route is to insist that “the ideal of citizenship be extended” to include women as full members, full individuals, of the state (196-7). This can be best exemplified in the woman as worker ideas of Marxist revolutionaries, but it must necessarily fail both by virtue of the definition of the term citizen and by the fact that it fails to recognize that there are differences in capabilities (such as bearing a child) between men and women.

The second route is to demand that the currently unpaid work of the woman in the home be recognized as productive and, hence, contributive to the welfare state. In doing this work, women are fulfilling their duties within the role of citizen (Pateman 197). This maneuver fails to address the dual dichotomies of public and private, and relegates women, still, to the Private sphere of the home where, in spite of any laws or economic remuneration, they will continue to be seen as the perpetual second sex.

Wollstonecraft’s Dilemma and attempts by women to traverse the paths laid out by it have both highlighted and ignored the fundamental, underlying problems of the liberal-democratic welfare state. The current structure does not even allow us the language with which to conceive of a new arrangement of life within the state. A radical redefinition of the terms citizen, private, public, and welfare must accompany a move away from the ideal of full employment (of white men) and the wealth accumulating goal of profit-seeking.

A legitimate candidate for the next step in this process of redefinition is the restructuring of employment law and norms to both better recognize work outside of the confines of the office and the factory as valuable work and afford both men and women equal opportunity and incentive to take part in that work. Men are just as well suited as women to be caregivers to their children, to clean the house, to prepare the meals, and to do the laundry. In essence, such a restructuring is a redefinition of the current ideal of citizenship. Work on the open market (the masculine ideal) would no longer be the only valuable form of work. Breaking down the barriers between Private and Public, between work (as a physical place) and home, allows both men and women to readjust their positions in the state in a positive way.

Recently we have seen pushes toward the mandated availability of both maternity and paternity leave of equal lengths. While some progressive workplaces do offer this ideal, it is still very far from the norm and will not be accepted without a fight by industries. This type of legislation would stand in stark contrast to the business friendly norm that allows employers to be profit-seeking entities for the good of wealthy shareholders and to the detriment of employees. Legislating paternity and maternity leave, or even commanding it, would bring more equity into childrearing and the work of the home while allowing mothers and fathers both to have a job to come back to; allowing both to be breadwinners.

This type of sharing of labor across the Public-Private divide is a necessary step in redefining citizenship. The welfare state plays a crucial role, even while in question, in that state support would be necessary to relieve market pressures on businesses to release mothers and fathers from employment. While many obstacles stand in the way of measures like this, it seems as though we have no choice but to move forward, to persevere, in this project of redefinition.

--The source cited in this text is Carole Pateman's "The Disorder of Women" published in 1989 by Stanford University Press--

The Means to Transcend Biology as Destiny

My first attempt at re-entering academia goes something like this (be forewarned, it's a weak attempt):

What is female and what has caused her always to be the second sex? These two fundamental questions are at the heart of Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex and provide the frame which we must consider in a reading of the first section of the text, Destiny. Three projects are laid before us, each of which provides a lens through which we can begin to discover some insights into these questions. Biology will provide us with the grounding idea of female as one of a pair necessary for the continuation of the species in many living beings, but not all. Psychoanalysis will offer the Electra complex as a mirror of the Oedipus in an attempt to parse down the description of woman to one essentially of sexuality. Historical materialism will place woman as the victim of the progress of the idea of private property.

While each of these projects will offer up some guidance, none alone can completely elucidate the situation of woman; however, of these three it is biology that today is still most often advanced as a reason, a justification for her Otherness. While the other two ideas have fallen out of fashion, biology remains a potent force entrenched in our mores and enshrined in our laws. Biology, though, finds its teeth only through perception, only by way of our existence as beings in the world. By virtue of this, biology is not a prison for woman but a project. Woman can transcend biology as we understand it today by resituating herself in the world, by redefining our common experience through a reworking of our laws, advancement of our tools, and a reexamination of our common goals.

In biology we find woman as the female of the human species. In this role she, as the female of all mammalian species and many others, is subjugated not only to the male by virtue of her muscular weakness and the prevailing social norms, but also to the species itself. She exists for biology as a body, a conglomeration of systems - more or less complex - that ingest, digest, respire, perspire, ambulate, and procreate. The body functions to maintain the individual in an effort to extend the species temporally. As such, woman is bound by biology to the reproductive role.

Where man transcends via his biology and reproductive organs, woman finds hers alienating. At puberty, her body changes to something she cannot immediately recognize as herself. From this point on to menopause (when nature returns her sovereign body to her) woman is at the service of the species. The ovarian cycle ties her to a monthly period that at times in history has been considered everything from unclean to vile to evil by man. Not by man’s perception alone is her period subjugating, though, as it can also be extremely painful and is accompanied by hormonal shifts. The monthly cycle may be interrupted by pregnancy which is the ultimate exertion of the species’ autonomy over woman. Not until the child is born and weaned do nature and society return to her small piece of her autonomy.

The trick played here by nature is that woman, as the most developed female in nature, both is bound most tightly to it and suffers it the most, as she alone among females has a nature of transcendence. This transcendent nature of the human being is in stark contrast to the subjugation by the species and makes woman feel this subjugation more strongly than any other female. As Beauvoir says, “The individuality of the female is opposed by the interest of the species; it is as if she were possessed by foreign forces – alienated (25).” But biology alone cannot explain fully the second sex for it ignores woman’s own perceptions of herself and her activity in the world outside of procreation.

The psychoanalytical view provides first for us the idea that the body exists not as the physical structure described by biology, but only in so much as it is a “body as lived in by the subject” (Beauvoir 38). Woman is not just the biological partner of the male of the human species; she is defined by her experience of the world and the objects she encounters in it. Not defined solely by biology, woman is also not bound only to her biological functions but also to her perceptions of the world and of herself as an emotional being. The psychoanalytic description of woman falls short, though, in that it is not one of woman as herself but, instead, a description of woman which mirrors its description of man. “He [Freud] declines,” Beauvoir states, “to regard the feminine libido as having its own original nature, and therefore it will necessarily seem to him like a complex deviation from the human [read male] libido in general (39).” Woman defines herself not as subject meeting the world but in relation to the sovereign subject immediately as Other. The Oedipus complex advances the idea that the boy defines himself in relation to his desire for his mother. He both fears and identifies with his father through this desire, and in doing so is able to define himself as a subject. The Electra complex, an inversion of this idea based still on the idea of a masculine libido, posits that the young girl’s desire shifts from mother to father. Her identity as a sexual being is bound up in this shift and manifests itself always as a desire to be dominated. So we find that while the ideas of body in the world are useful, psychoanalysis neglects to define woman as herself and as a subject.

The project of historical materialism presents for us a world in which the proletariat, the downtrodden masses, finds within its history the possibility for its own salvation. Only parallel to this greater drama is the manifestation of woman as subject able to unfold. Beauvoir elaborates that “the fate of woman and that of socialism are intimately bound up together” within the framework provided by Engels and others (55). Woman, like the proletariat, was bound to otherness by the advent of private property. Man seeks alienation, to see himself in something other than himself. In this quest he discovers himself in ownership of property, as the master of land, of slaves, of woman. Woman cannot, by virtue of her biology, carry the weight of man. She is not strong enough to wield his tools, the tools of subjugation. It is in light of this that she can only transcend her otherness through the realization of the socialist economy. As part of the force of production, as one of the many workers, she can come into her own being. But this ignores that woman is woman. Historical materialism focuses on the productive force of woman but ignores the reproductive force. When it must be reaffirmed, it is done so not as a project of woman, but forcefully by law and mores as in the Soviet Union’s paternalistic laws requiring femininity, banning abortion, birth control and divorce, and firming up the institution of marriage. The project of historical materialism provides us with a more concrete idea of the project of becoming. The existential framework of transcendence is devoloping, but woman is still not examined as such.

Looking back toward biology through the layered lenses of psychoanalysis and historical materialism, we can begin to recognize woman as the biological female who is transcendent in nature, capable of self definition, and in need of a means by which to realize transcendence and self definition. Woman is in need of economic freedom as pointed out by Engels’ project, of a means of self definition all her own not tied to man’s as Beauvoir’s critique of psychoanalysis elucidated, and in need of means of breaking free from her subjugation by the species. All three of these needs, it seems, are intricately intertwined within economics, politics, and science and technology. Woman is not confined by her femaleness, for it takes on meaning “only in light of the ends man proposes, the instruments he has available, and the laws he establishes (Beauvoir 34).” These needs constitute a project, a portion of the project of feminism, a project that can come and is coming to fruition today.

In the scope of changing laws, in economics, and in technology we have already seen great advancements for woman now defined as an equal in the eyes of the government from suffrage to employment law and beyond. She has entered the workforce with full force and taken up projects beside man. She has begun to break the economic grips of man on her autonomy. Woman has also begun breaking the grip of the species through advancements in birth control (now capable of allowing a woman even to forgo her period for a time) and women’s health in general.

So we see that there are hurdles being overcome in laws and in instruments that have allowed woman greater degrees of autonomy from both man and the species, yet she has still not been defined as herself and as a subject. Woman still is, at this time, defined and self-defined often in relation to the species and to man. One area where the project beginning to take shape in this early section of the text has not advanced is in a redefinition of “the ends man proposes.” It is in redefining these ends and taking equality and similarity over differentiation, social good over personal gain, accumulation in the public trust over personal wealth, humility over strength, and compassion over power that we can continue to further this project. By creating a living situation in which man and woman take equal responsibility for child care, care of the home, economic well being, and care of each other as well as a society which is willing to forgo miniscule losses in production and wealth for the good of its citizens woman can take another step toward defining herself as the One. She can stand face to face with man each One the others Other but on common and equal ground.

Reading Beauvoir

We’re reading, in my Feminist Theory class, The Second Sex as our first text of the semester. Last night we discussed the Intro, the Independent Woman, and the Conclusion of the text. One paragraph elicited some heated discussion, and I want to take a bit of time to try to work through some of my thoughts on the following from page 712:

Woman is in any case deprived of the lessons of violence by her nature: I have shown how her muscular weakness disposes her to passivity. When a boy settles a dispute with his fists, he feels that he is capable of taking care of himself; at the least, the young girl should in compensation be permitted to know how it feels to take the initiative in sport and adventure, to taste the pride of obstacles overcome. But not at all. She may feel herself alone in the midst of the world, but she never stands up before it, unique and sovereign.

What we have here, at face value, is Beauvoir providing another example of how her situation prevents woman from transcending, from realizing herself wholly as Subject. In the final sentence she says woman “can feel herself alone” as an individual in the world. She can feel herself unique, but she cannot feel that she can take charge, that she can project herself onto the world, that she can change the current state of reality; she feels herself incapable of boldly standing up to the world as sovereign Subject. Beauvoir implies that woman’s lack of “lessons of violence” contributes to this position in relation to the world. She has not felt that she can “take care of” herself, and for that reason, she does not.

What’s interesting here is that throughout the Independent Woman Beauvoir is making the case that woman simply playing man is not sufficient, is not transcendence. Woman must succeed on her own terms and in her own right. She provides phenomenologies of women imitating man, but falling short or remaining unfulfilled. She is constantly aware that physical differences in the sexes do exist, and that this in itself is not a hindrance and to acknowledge it not a wrong. In this paragraph, however, the patriarchal value of violence seems to prevail. Why is it that Beauvoir neglects to tear down, here, the lofty place of physical force in our collective weltbild? She seems here to simply accept that physical force (be it in the form of violence, sport, adventure, etc) is in some way necessary to the realization of oneself as the One, and not that this is just another construct of the masculine weltbild of which we are heirs.

One could argue that physical force is such a thing; that it is a necessity in this realization because it is such a tangible and accessible representation of ones ability to transcend. If you can move the impediment from your path with physical force you can at once witness your ability to affect reality; you can at once realize your sovereignty.

I think that there is something much more subtle going on here, though. The distinction between masculine violence as the “boy settles a dispute with his fists” and the girl who “takes initiative in sport and adventure” is purposeful. This distinction is not solely in place to say that this might be what society would allow at this given point in time given the situation that woman finds herself in, for if that were the case then what would be the point of the entire text, the entire project? Beauvoir constantly pushes that line, why would she hold back here. I think the distinction is a subtle reminder, actually, of what I said earlier…that the author recognizes the real differences that exist and that woman, once again, must, even in physical force, find her own way and not the masculine way. Woman must learn from the outset to use the body she has to overcome physical obstacles, and in doing so the young girl, as the young boy using his fists, can feel herself to be in control, capable of affecting reality. She can feel herself “unique AND sovereign.”

Already?!?!

Wow! Did this summer fly by! I can’t believe classes start next Wednesday. I can’t believe I’m buying books right now, or that I have an orientation at GMU this Thursday. Where did my summer go? Where did my trips to Great Falls go? Where did Sunday morning perusing the local farmers markets go? How is it that my summers are always packed full of weekends traveling about the Northeast, but rarely do I seem to have time to enjoy them? I look forward to summer, I build it up, I have more expectations than can possibly fit into that short span between April and September. It’s not that it hasn’t been great fun. It has. It’s just that there’s always so much more I wanted to do when these chilly days of fall start coming upon us. I know I’m jumping the gun here, it’s only mid-August, but DC had one of those fall days today. It’s football season now, the leaves will change soon, and it’s time to go back to school…for all intents and purposes, summer has passed.

I’m developing a new framework as of late to understand how the psychology of all of these expectations works. Developing is a lie…I’m reading a book called Stumbling on Happiness, and, though it’s far from an academic treatise, it helpfully lays out the research of how the mind imagines a future, only summarily filling in the blanks. How we imagine our tomorrow’s much like our todays but with little regard for time, for reasonable expectations. Our imaginations are so far from exact tools. I imagined a summer of endless weekends spent at the beach, in the woods, meandering the streets of DC, and cuddled up with my baby. I imagined more into that summer than time could possibly allow, but in my temporally inept imagination, it all fit nicely, sequentially on my timeline. Oh well, one can’t lament, I suppose on such a summer spent. I did have fun, I did see old friends and go to some great parties. I saw the ocean once again, and spent time in my baby’s arms. Now it’s almost fall…and I love the changing of the leaves, the chill in the air, the Steelers on TV. I’ll try not to make the same mistake…to imagine an impossibly wonderful fall…but aren’t we optimistic creatures? I’m sure I’ll fall victim to the same trap and write this same post again on the first snowfall of the year…but so be it.

Amusement Parks – A Marxist Oasis (At Least They Used To Be)

I spent the day yesterday at Six Flags America with my roommate. It was great…no crowds, perfect weather, hit every coaster in the park twice. Superman is one of the best steel coasters I’ve EVER ridden; just plain awesome, but I still love the classic wooden coasters the most. There was just one thing that bugged me throughout the day.

Standing in line gave me some time to reflect on this new phenomenon that Six Flags refers to as the Flash Pass. Maybe it was only by virtue of the annoyance caused me by being cut in front of on numerous occasions by “Flash Pass Riders,” but this seemed to me not just dumb but an egregious affront to the communist social contract that riders and amusement park operators enter into once said rider has paid admission into the park. Yes, yes, I know that the capitalists have already taken over the front gates and the food stands…oy! for crying out loud, the food stands! But besides paying for my $8 diet cola, $4 hotdog, and a scrumptious $5 fried, gooey, powder-sugared, goodness known as a funnel cake, I expect lines! And I expect all to be on equal footing in those lines! I expect every rider to understand that she will patiently (or impatiently) wait in the hot sun, moving one foot every 5 minutes, bumping butts, elbows, shoulders, and whatever else gets in the way with the guest in front of, behind, and beside her, enduring the screams of dehydrated and bored children until she finally reaches that joyous moment when she is at the front of the line waiting for that gate to open so that she may slide into that seat, lock down her harness and bask in her 45 seconds of ecstasy that is an amusement park ride. She should not, after waiting all that time in that hot sun be told that “this is a Flash Pass Train, please step back and allow Flash Pass Riders to choose their seats.” She should not have to wait for the next train, it’s her turn!

The capitalist pigs are making an inroad into this amazing little oasis where we all stood once on equal ground, all stood together waiting on queue for our piece of the pie. No longer…now any impatient schmuck with a little disposable income can jump to the front of the line. Soon everyone will buy a pass, and then there’ll be a Flash Pass Line to wait on, and we’ll have two trains…one for Flashers and one for the poor bastards who couldn’t afford it. We’ll have a two-tiered amusement park society! A Six Flags apartheid! But the Flash Passers won’t want to wait in line, so there will then be tiers of Flash Passes with auctions to set the prices. The haves will be paying $100 extra per ride, just to jump to the front! WAIT YOUR TURN! I say. Give us back our little communist refuge in this die hard capitalist world. Take away the Flash Pass before it ruins us all!

Markets and Electorates

Perusing the internets today (it was a long and slow day in the office), I came across the page of Bryan Caplan, an economics professor at GMU (a hotbed of Austrian free-market folks on the US scene). It appears that Prof Caplan has a new book out called The Myth of the Rational Voter, in which his central thesis seems to be the idea that the average member of the electorate not only is ill-informed in regards to economic policy, but actually makes irrational voting decisions even based on the information s/he has. He bases this on a survey of average voters as compared to economists and highly educated non-economists. The results show that economists would be more likely to vote for stronger free-market outcomes than average voters, a boon for the Libertarian Caplan, and that economic policy may be best left in the hands of the “experts” as average voters affected by certain biases actually skew policy instead of reaching the best possible outcome through the “miracle of aggregation.” (Note, please, that I have not read Prof Caplan’s book and am certain I am doing neither his argument nor his research justice.)

This started me thinking (and be forewarned, this is mere musing not backed by any evidence beyond the anecdotal and likely not properly reasoned) democratic principles at work in politics versus those at work in a market, and the shortfalls of both. Markets serve a number of purposes, but two above all else. The first is the setting of an agreeable (not equitable, not rational, but agreeable) price at which a commodity might be passed from one actor to another. Markets are unquestionably efficient and successful at this task, and are also self regulating by virtue of the fact that the commodity simply will not change hands if the price is not agreeable to both parties. Markets are also conveyors of information through the act of price setting. The manager of the steel mill knows how much to produce for all of the various buyers by virtue of the price. If prices are rising s/he knows to produce more as there is greater demand. If prices are falling, there is a surplus on the market and the manager should hold back production. This can change day to day across millions of markets for billions of commodities, more than any person or computer can track efficiently, yet markets are able to make these on-the-fly corrections because they convey the knowledge of the person-on-the-street through interactions of supply and demand. Towards these two ends, price and information, markets are unmatchable, but notice that I say that markets set agreeable prices, not equitable or rational prices.

Markets, I think, don’t account for the greater good. Their outcomes are geared towards creating exchanges at prices agreed upon by buyers and sellers, but these buyers and sellers are, as Caplan says the electorate is, both ignorant of their true needs/desires and acting irrationally. Perception of needs and desires are skewed by greed, among other factors. The lust for money (i.e. profit seeking, in econ-speak) has created an entire multi-billion dollar industry around manipulating buyers’ desires. How has the market reached a equitable outcome when you can drive past a dilapidated home in need of numerous repairs with a Lincoln SUV with rims worth a few grand sitting in front of it? How has the market reached a equitable outcome when the upper echelon of society sees it’s income growing exponentially while the middle-class and impoverished fall further behind? These are clear examples of ignorance, by the market, or the greater good. But what of rationality in decision making? Even actors acting on incorrect information about their own needs are not acting rationally. For evidence, just look to the stock market bouncing to and fro on the whims of investors. Fear, arrogance, and caprice, not rationality, are market driving forces.

So maybe Caplan is onto something, that economists, not the electorate, should determine economic policy, but at least the electorate wears its ignorance and its irrationality on its sleeve, and doesn’t hide it behind fanciful explanations like the market does. Democracy doesn’t bring about the best of all possible outcomes, but like the free-market, it brings about an agreeable one.

Reflections on a New Experience

For the past six or seven months I’ve had a headache. It’s fairly constant, fairly consistent, but far from severe or debilitating. At times it flares up, others it subsides, and from time to time it seems gone entirely. I think of these little nuggets of time as moments of clarity, of sorts. They’re times when I can think and act without the constant wondering of what’s causing this bit of pain at my forehead, nose, and teeth. In any case, these headaches aren’t terrible, but they are annoying, and I’ve seen a GP, an eye doctor, and an ear, nose, and throat guy in attempts to figure out what’s causing them. I’ve heard explanations from high blood pressure (now under control) to sleep apnea, but none of these explanations with their solutions has panned out.

So, on Monday, I did it. I left work early, drove out to Annandale at the suggestion of a cousin, and visited an acupuncturist. Now, Eastern medicine, mythology, religion, and philosophy have always deeply intrigued me, so this was no far reach for me, but it was interesting to measure it up to my long held expectations. I’ve considered yoga before, studied Eastern philosophy, and do meditate and practice breathing exercises (though not as often as I’d like), but have never sought out the aid of a “professional.” I expected something holistic in his methods and demeanor; maybe an older man or woman taking the time to discus my problems, my lifestyle, her thoughts on my condition, and potential treatments or lifestyle changes. I expected a slow, but practiced and sure progression into treatment and a rational setting of my expectations.

Wow, was I off base! Entering the office was interesting in itself. The walls and shelves were lined with boxes labeled in Chinese, large jars with roots of some sort or another suspended in liquids, other jars with ground substances, and all enveloped with a distinct earthy odor. To this point my expectations remained intact. I filled out a questionnaire about myself, answered a few other questions and was led into a room. A few moments later a 30-something year old man in a while lab coat entered and shook my hand. He reminded me more of the chiropractor I used to visit than of a practitioner of some ancient form of medicine. The man briefly scanned my questionnaire and asked me where my headache was centralized. Within seconds he had me on my back tapping needles into my stomach and face. Fifteen minutes later I was in the bathroom wiping the little beads of dried blood from my cheeks, not quite sure what had just transpired. Talk about misconceptions! He gave me only a bit of advice, “Don’t overeat, and no cold drinks,” “Don’t worry so much,” and “Your sinuses are very tight.” He then asked me to come back on Wednesday and Friday. On my way out, the young receptionist charged $30 to my card and sent me on my way.

In this time when complaints abound about the lack of time doctors spend with patients, forced by insurers to move us in and out one of after the other like an assembly line of medicine, I expected something different here. I failed to realize that these practitioners are a part of the same system, operating in the same constraints. They have bills to pay and mouths to feed and the way money is made is by a constant flow in but also out of the door. We leave no time in our lives for questioning, for explanation. The quick fix is the American way.

Even so, I went back today and will again on Friday. The experience is one of incredible relaxation for that short time left alone, lying perfectly still, listening to your own breathing with no distraction. That solitude, that time of release, of freedom of the mind might be worth $30 alone. I don’t know if acupuncture is working for me, but I’ll give it three or four weeks and see if there are any results. In the meantime, I know not to expect much from my acupuncturist beyond a few needle sticks and a brief massage.